Kyoto, Japan — Scanning your brain to decode the contents of your mind has been a subject of intense research interest for some time. As studies have progressed, scientists have gradually been able to interpret what test subjects see, remember, imagine, and even dream.

There have been significant limitations, however, beginning with a necessity to extensively catalog each subject’s unique brain patterns, which are then matched with a small number of pre-programmed images. These procedures require that subjects undergo lengthy and expensive fMRI testing.

Accidental Discovery in the Lab

The discovery happened unexpectedly during research on warty comb jellies (Mnemiopsis leidyi), also known as sea walnuts, in a lab at the University of Exeter. Researchers noticed that one jelly was missing from a tank, only to realize that a larger jelly was actually two individuals fused together. This accidental fusion occurred when the jellies sustained minor injuries. Excited by the finding, study lead author Kei Jokura immediately shared the discovery with other lab members.

The team then tested whether this fusion could be replicated. They injured 20 comb jellies by removing small sections of their bodies and placed them near each other. Out of the 20, nine pairs fused completely, typically within 24 hours. The merging process also affected their nervous systems, which synchronized rapidly. Researchers observed that the fused individuals reacted as one when poked, indicating a full integration of their neural functions.

Mycelium can plan and strategize based on their surroundings, even without brains.

Two participants entered a lucid dream and exchanged first ever ‘chat’ in dreams with specially designed equipment during REMspace experiment.

Scientists discovered that the molecule CaMKII helps neurons encode information over seconds, a key process in learning. This challenges previous beliefs about how CaMKII influences synapse-specific plasticity.

A recent study from the Max Planck Florida Institute for Neuroscience, published in Nature, has uncovered a crucial step in how neurons encode information on timescales aligned with the process of learning.

A timing mismatch.

Can we in principle ever deduce the mental from the physical?

Christopher Devlin Brown and David Papineau have a new paper out in the Journal of Consciousness Studies titled: Illusionism and A Posteriori Physicalism; No Fact of the Matter. (Note: the link is to a free version.) As the title makes clear, the overall gist is that the difference between illusionism and a posteriori physicalism amounts to a definitional dispute.

A quick primer. Illusionism is the stance that consciousness exists, but only in the sense of functional capabilities such as modeling the self in its environment, attention, learning, episodic memory, self monitoring, etc. What’s thought to be illusory is phenomenal consciousness, the “what it’s like” nature of subjective experience, but particularly in the strong sense as something distinct from functional capabilities, and with properties, such as fundamental subjectivity, that imply it’s non-physical.

Susan Blackmore’s Consciousness: A Very Short Introduction may have been the first book I read on consciousness many years ago. Recent conversations rekindled my interest in her views.

I’m pretty sure her discussion of consciousness as an illusion was the first time I had encountered that idea. Strong illusionists such as Keith Frankish and Daniel Dennett generally take the stance that phenomenal consciousness doesn’t exist. Blackmore’s illusionism seems like a weaker form, that consciousness exists but isn’t what it seems. And by “consciousness” she stipulates in one of her books that she usually means phenomenal consciousness.

Of course, the difference between a strong and weak illusionist can be seen as mostly definitional. Strong illusionists generally take “phenomenal consciousness” to refer to the metaphysically intrinsic, private, ineffable, and incorrigible concept discussed by Nagel, Chalmers, and other non-physicalists, one that is ontologically separate from access (functional) consciousness. A weak illusionist sees this version as illusory, but is more willing to just consider the illusion itself a reconstructed version of “phenomenal”