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Disease-associated radial glia-like cells with epigenetically dysregulated interferon response in MS

Li et al. report that Edwardsiella piscicida employs HigA, an anti-toxin protein, to facilitate the diversion of tryptophan metabolism to the kynurenine pathway, rather than the serotonin pathway, by directly activating IDO1 in a T6SS-dependent manner as a cross-kingdom effector. The serotonin-level fluctuation modulates host intestinal histological damage and bacterial infection.

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Size doesn’t matter: Just a small number of malicious files can corrupt LLMs of any size

Large language models (LLMs), which power sophisticated AI chatbots, are more vulnerable than previously thought. According to research by Anthropic, the UK AI Security Institute and the Alan Turing Institute, it only takes 250 malicious documents to compromise even the largest models.

The vast majority of data used to train LLMs is scraped from the public internet. While this helps them to build knowledge and generate natural responses, it also puts them at risk from data poisoning attacks. It had been thought that as models grew, the risk was minimized because the percentage of poisoned data had to remain the same. In other words, it would need massive amounts of data to corrupt the largest models. But in this study, which is published on the arXiv preprint server, researchers showed that an attacker only needs a small number of poisoned documents to potentially wreak havoc.

To assess the ease of compromising large AI models, the researchers built several LLMs from scratch, ranging from small systems (600 million parameters) to very large (13 billion parameters). Each model was trained on vast amounts of clean public data, but the team inserted a fixed number of malicious files (100 to 500) into each one.

Method teaches generative AI models to locate personalized objects

Say a person takes their French Bulldog, Bowser, to the dog park. Identifying Bowser as he plays among the other canines is easy for the dog owner to do while onsite.

But if someone wants to use a generative AI model like GPT-5 to monitor their pet while they are at work, the model could fail at this basic task. Vision-language models like GPT-5 often excel at recognizing general objects, like a dog, but they perform poorly at locating personalized objects, like Bowser the French Bulldog.

To address this shortcoming, researchers from MIT and the MIT-IBM Watson AI Lab have introduced a new training method that teaches vision-language models to localize personalized objects in a scene.

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