Lifeboat Foundation

More than 400 years ago, Galileo showed that many everyday phenomena—such as a ball rolling down an incline or a chandelier gently swinging from a church ceiling—obey precise mathematical laws. For this insight, he is often hailed as the founder of modern science. But Galileo recognized that not everything was amenable to a quantitative approach. Such things as colors, tastes and smells “are no more than mere names,” Galileo declared, for “they reside only in consciousness.” These qualities aren’t really out there in the world, he asserted, but exist only in the minds of creatures that perceive them. “Hence if the living creature were removed,” he wrote, “all these qualities would be wiped away and annihilated.”

Since Galileo’s time the physical sciences have leaped forward, explaining the workings of the tiniest quarks to the largest galaxy clusters. But explaining things that reside “only in consciousness”—the red of a sunset, say, or the bitter taste of a lemon—has proven far more difficult. Neuroscientists have identified a number of neural correlates of consciousness —brain states associated with specific mental states—but have not explained how matter forms minds in the first place. As philosopher David Chalmers asked: “How does the water of the brain turn into the wine of consciousness?” He famously dubbed this quandary the “hard problem” of consciousness.

Continue reading “Is Consciousness Part of the Fabric of the Universe?” »

A letter, signed by 124 scholars and posted online last week, has caused an uproar in the consciousness-research community. It argues that a prominent theory describing what makes someone or something conscious — called the integrated information theory (IIT) — should be labelled as pseudoscience. Since its publication on 15 September in the preprint repository PsyArXiv1, the letter has resulted in some researchers arguing over the label and others worrying that it will increase polarization in a field that has grappled with issues of credibility in the past.

Decades-long bet on consciousness ends — and it’s philosopher 1, neuroscientist 0

“I think it’s inflammatory to describe IIT as pseudoscience,” says neuroscientist Anil Seth, director of the Centre for Consciousness Science at the University of Sussex near Brighton, UK, adding that he disagrees with the label. “IIT is a theory, of course, and therefore may be empirically wrong,” says Christof Koch, a meritorious investigator at the Allen Institute for Brain Science in Seattle, Washington, and a proponent of the theory. But he says that it makes its assumptions — for example, that consciousness has a physical basis and can be mathematically measured — very clear.

Continue reading “Consciousness theory slammed as ‘pseudoscience’ — sparking uproar” »

Integrated information theory is seen by some people as a leading theory of consciousness, but now over 100 neuroscientists have signed an open letter calling it untestable pseudoscience.

By Clare Wilson

In the 1939 neuroscientists began cutting living human brains in two in order to treat certain types of epileptic seizures. Subsequent experiments on those patients gave science an unnerving window into the nature of human consciousness. It turns out that there might be more versions inside of your own brain than you might be comfortable with.

#splitbrain #consciousness #malcovich #neuroscience.

Continue reading “The Unsettling Truth about Human Consciousness | The Split Brain experiment that broke neuroscience” »

New research found sophisticated reasoning in AI models that could enable situational awareness, posing safety risks if left uncontrolled.

HOTs posit a possible way for the brain to render mental states conscious.

I’ve released my latest paper. Enjoy:

Abstract.

A common interpretation of wakeful, nondestructive mind uploading is that the person with the postoperative original body exclusively persists the preoperative identity and that the person with the upload’s body is some sort of identity copy. A frequent argument supporting this claim is that the preoperative person’s stream of consciousness attaches exclusively to the postoperative person with the original body. By implication, the person with the upload’s body spawns a new stream of consciousness, implying copy identity status. I argue that this is not the best metaphysical model of what happens in nondestructive uploading in the context of a stream of consciousness interpretation, and defend an alternative model which has generally received little attention in the existing literature: the branching identity model.

A five-year “adversarial collaboration” of consciousness theorists led to a stagy showdown in front of an audience. It crowned no winners — but it can still claim progress.

Organizing and comparing the major candidate theories in the field.