Lifeboat Foundation

Recent advances in deep learning have allowed artificial intelligence (AI) to reach near human-level performance in many sensory, perceptual, linguistic, and cognitive tasks. There is a growing need, however, for novel, brain-inspired cognitive architectures. The Global Workspace Theory (GWT) refers to a large-scale system integrating and distributing information among networks of specialized modules to create higher-level forms of cognition and awareness. We argue that the time is ripe to consider explicit implementations of this theory using deep-learning techniques. We propose a roadmap based on unsupervised neural translation between multiple latent spaces (neural networks trained for distinct tasks, on distinct sensory inputs and/or modalities) to create a unique, amodal Global Latent Workspace (GLW). Potential functional advantages of GLW are reviewed, along with neuroscientific implications.

Keywords: attention; broadcast; consciousness; grounding; latent space; multimodal translation.

Copyright © 2021 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

This paper investigates the compatibility between the theoretical framework of the global neuronal workspace theory (GNWT) of conscious processing and the perturbational complexity index (PCI). Even if it has been introduced within the framework of a concurrent theory (i.e. Integrated Information Theory), PCI appears, in principle, compatible with the main tenet of GNWT, which is a conscious process that depends on a long-range connection between different cortical regions, more specifically on the amplification, global propagation, and integration of brain signals. Notwithstanding this basic compatibility, a number of limited compatibilities and apparent differences emerge. This paper starts from the description of brain complexity, a notion that is crucial for PCI, to then summary of the main features of PCI and the main tenets of GNWT. Against this background, the text explores the compatibility between PCI and GNWT. It concludes that GNWT and PCI are fundamentally compatible, even though there are some partial disagreements and some points to further examine.

Keywords: brain complexity; global neuronal worskpace theory; measurement of consciousness; perturbational complexity index; theory of consciousness.

© The Author(s) 2023. Published by Oxford University Press.

Philosophical and theoretical debates on the multiple realisability of the cognitive have historically influenced discussions of the possible systems capable of instantiating complex functions like memory, learning, goal-directedness, and decision-making. These debates have had the corollary of undermining, if not altogether neglecting, the materiality and corporeality of cognition-treating material, living processes as “hardware” problems that can be abstracted out and, in principle, implemented in a variety of materials-in particular on digital computers and in the form of state-of-the-art neural networks. In sum, the matter in se has been taken not to matter for cognition. However, in this paper, we argue that the materiality of cognition-and the living, self-organizing processes that it enables-requires a more detailed assessment when understanding the nature of cognition and recreating it in the field of embodied robotics. Or, in slogan form, that the matter matters for cognitive form and function. We pull from the fields of Active Matter Physics, Soft Robotics, and Basal Cognition literature to suggest that the imbrication between material and cognitive processes is closer than standard accounts of multiple realisability suggest. In light of this, we propose upgrading the notion of multiple realisability from the standard version-what we call 1.0-to a more nuanced conception 2.0 to better reflect the recent empirical advancements, while at the same time averting many of the problems that have been raised for it. These fields are actively reshaping the terrain in which we understand materiality and how it enables, mediates, and constrains cognition. We propose that taking the materiality of our embodied, precarious nature seriously furnishes an important research avenue for the development of embodied robots that autonomously value, engage, and interact with the environment in a goal-directed manner, in response to existential needs of survival, persistence, and, ultimately, reproduction. Thus, we argue that by placing further emphasis on the soft, active, and plastic nature of the materials that constitute cognitive embodiment, we can move further in the direction of autonomous embodied robots and Artificial Intelligence.

Keywords: active matter physics; artificial intelligence; basal cognition; embodied cognition; fine-grained functionalism; functionalism; multiple realisability; soft robotics.

Copyright © 2022 Harrison, Rorot and Laukaityte.

This study introduces a novel methodology for consciousness science. Consciousness as we understand it pretheoretically is inherently subjective, yet the data available to science are irreducibly intersubjective. This poses a unique challenge for attempts to investigate consciousness empirically. We meet this challenge by combining two insights. First, we emphasize the role that computational models play in integrating results relevant to consciousness from across the cognitive sciences. This move echoes Alan Newell’s call that the language and concepts of computer science serve as a lingua franca for integrative cognitive science. Second, our central contribution is a new method for validating computational models that treats them as providing negative data on consciousness: data about what consciousness is not. This method is designed to support a quantitative science of consciousness while avoiding metaphysical commitments. We discuss how this methodology applies to current and future research and address questions that others have raised.

Keywords: computationalism; consciousness; evidence; functionalism; methodology; modeling.

© The Author(s) 2021. Published by Oxford University Press.

The physicality of the world in which the animal acts-its anatomical structure, physiology, perception, emotional states, and cognitive capabilities-determines the boundaries of the behavioral space within which the animal can operate. Behavior, therefore, can be considered as the subspace that remains after secluding all actions that are not available to the animal due to constraints. The very signature of being a certain creature is reflected in these limitations that shape its behavior. A major goal of ethology is to expose those constraints that carve the intricate structure of animal behavior and reveal both uniqueness and commonalities between animals within and across taxa. Exploratory behavior in an empty arena seems to be stochastic; nevertheless, it does not mean that the moving animal is a random walker. In this study, we present how, by adding constraints to the animal’s locomotion, one can gradually retain the ‘mousiness’ that characterizes the behaving mouse. We then introduce a novel phenomenon of high mirror symmetry along the locomotion of mice, which highlights another constraint that further compresses the complex nature of exploratory behavior in these animals. We link these findings to a known neural mechanism that could explain this phenomenon. Finally, we suggest our novel finding and derived methods to be used in the search for commonalities in the motion trajectories of various organisms across taxa.

Keywords: animal behavior; constraints; exploration; locomotion; memory; mouse; operational space; symmetry.

Copyright © 2024 Fonio and Feinerman.

Although the hippocampus is generally considered a cognitive center for spatial representation, learning, and memory, increasing evidence supports its roles in regulating locomotion. However, the neuronal mechanisms of the hippocampal regulation of locomotion and exploratory behavior remain unclear. In this study, we found that the inhibitory hippocampal synaptic projection to the medial septum (MS) bi-directionally controls the locomotor speed of mice. The activation of the MS-projecting interneurons in the hippocampus or the activation of the hippocampus-originated inhibitory synaptic terminals in the MS decreased locomotion and exploratory behavior. On the other hand, the inhibition of the hippocampus-originated inhibitory synaptic terminals in the MS increased locomotion. Unlike the septal projecting interneurons, the activation of the hippocampal interneurons projecting to the retrosplenial cortex did not change animal locomotion. Therefore, this study reveals a specific long-range inhibitory synaptic output from the hippocampus to the medial septum in the regulation of animal locomotion.

Keywords: GABAergic interneuron; exploratory behavior; hippocampus; inhibitory synapse; locomotion; septum.

Copyright © 2023 Chen, Arano, Guo, Saleem, Li and Xu.

According to Loorits, if we want consciousness to be explained in terms of natural sciences, we should be able to analyze its seemingly non-structural aspects, like qualia, in structural terms. However, the studies conducted over the last three decades do not seem to be able to bridge the explanatory gap between physical phenomena and phenomenal experience. One possible way to bridge the explanatory gap is to seek the structure of consciousness within consciousness itself, through a phenomenal analysis of the qualitative aspects of experience. First, this analysis leads us to identify the explanandum concerning the simplest forms of experience not in qualia but in the unitary set of qualities found in early vision. Second, it leads us to hypothesize that consciousness is also made up of non-apparent parts, and that there exists a hidden structure of consciousness. This structure, corresponding to a simple early visual experience, is constituted by a Hierarchy of Spatial Belongings nested within each other. Each individual Spatial Belonging is formed by a primary content and a primary space. The primary content can be traced in the perceptibility of the contents we can distinguish in the phenomenal field. The primary space is responsible for the perceptibility of the content and is not perceptible in itself. However, the phenomenon I refer to as subtraction of visibility allows us to characterize it as phenomenally negative. The hierarchical relationships between Spatial Belongings can ensure the qualitative nature of components of perceptual organization, such as object, background, and detail. The hidden structure of consciousness presents aspects that are decidedly counterintuitive compared to our idea of phenomenal experience. However, on the one hand, the Hierarchy of Spatial Belongings can explain the qualities of early vision and their appearance as a unitary whole, while on the other hand, it might be more easily explicable in terms of brain organization. In other words, the hidden structure of consciousness can be considered a bridge structure which, placing itself at an intermediate level between experience and physical properties, can contribute to bridging the explanatory gap.

Keywords: early vision; explanandum; explanatory gap; hidden conscious structure; hierarchy of spatial belongings; multiple hierarchical segregation; phenomenal analysis.

Copyright © 2024 Forti.

Can one have a phenomenal experience to which one does not have access? That is, can you experience something without knowing? The dissociation between phenomenal ℗ and access (A) consciousness is widely debated. A major challenge to the supporters of this dissociation is the apparent inability to experimentally demonstrate that P-without-A consciousness exists; once participants report having a P-experience, they already have access to it. Thus, all previous empirical support for this dissociation is indirect. Here, using a novel paradigm, we create a situation where participants (Experiment 1, N = 40) lack online access to the stimulus yet are nevertheless able to retrospectively form judgements on its phenomenal, qualitative aspects. We further show that their performance cannot be fully explained by unconscious processing or by a response to stimulus offset (Experiment 2, N = 40). This suggests that P and A consciousness are not only conceptually distinct, but might also be teased apart empirically. STATEMENT OF RELEVANCE: A critical question in the scientific quest towards solving the problem of consciousness focuses on the ability to isolate conscious experiences at their purity, without any accompanying cognitive processes. This challenge has been augmented by a highly influential — yet controversial — dissociation suggested by the philosopher Ned Block between Phenomenal consciousness, or the “what it is like” to have an experience, and Access consciousness, indexing the ability to report that one has that experience. Critically, these two types of consciousness most typically go together, making it highly difficult — if not impossible — to isolate Phenomenal consciousness. Our work shows that the dissociation between phenomenal and access consciousness is not merely conceptual, but can also be empirically demonstrated. It further opens the gate to future studies pinpointing the neural correlates of the two types of consciousness.

Keywords: Access consciousness; Cognition; Consciousness; Phenomenal consciousness; Qualia; Unconscious processing.

Copyright © 2023 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

In pre-clinical trials, a small molecule effectively regrew neurons, reduced inflammation, and improved memory, speed, coordination, grip strength, and more. The finding could have a profound impact on aging and the diseases that accompany it.

In conducting the research, scientists at the University of Texas MD Anderson Cancer Center, turned their focus to telomerase reverse transcriptase (TERT), an enzyme that is known to help synthesize and extend telomeres, the protective caps at the ends of chromosomes that help cells divide. TERT levels are reduced as we age.

Without sufficient levels of TERT, when our telomeres shrink or get seriously modified, they can lead to a process that continually damages our DNA, which causes cells to release inflammatory compounds that can in turn lead to aging, tissue damage, and cancer.