{"id":240331,"date":"2026-07-05T15:06:47","date_gmt":"2026-07-05T20:06:47","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/lifeboat.com\/blog\/2026\/07\/eliminative-materialism-stanford-encyclopedia-of-philosophy"},"modified":"2026-07-05T15:06:47","modified_gmt":"2026-07-05T20:06:47","slug":"eliminative-materialism-stanford-encyclopedia-of-philosophy","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/lifeboat.com\/blog\/2026\/07\/eliminative-materialism-stanford-encyclopedia-of-philosophy","title":{"rendered":"Eliminative Materialism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)"},"content":{"rendered":"

In principle, anyone denying the existence of some type of thing is an eliminativist with regard to that type of thing. Thus, there have been a number of eliminativists about different aspects of human nature in the history of philosophy. For example, hard determinists like Holbach<\/a> (1770) are eliminativists with regard to free will because they claim there is no dimension of human psychology that corresponds to our commonsense notion of freedom. Similarly, by denying that there is an ego or persisting subject of experience, Hume<\/a> (1739) was arguably an eliminativist about the self. Reductive materialists can be viewed as eliminativists with respect to an immaterial soul.<\/p>\n

Nevertheless, contemporary eliminative materialism\u2014the sort of eliminativism that denies the existence of specific types of mental states\u2014is a relatively new theory with a very short history. The term was first introduced by James Cornman in a 1968 article entitled \u201cOn the Elimination of \u2018Sensations\u2019 and Sensations\u201d (Cornman, 1968). However, the basic idea goes back at least as far as C.D. Broad\u2019s classic, The Mind and its Place in Nature<\/em> (Broad, 1925). Here Broad discusses, and quickly rejects, a type of \u201cpure materialism\u201d that treats mental states as attributes that apply to nothing in the world (pp. 607\u2013611). Like many future writers (see section 4.1 below), Broad argued that such a view is self-contradictory since it (presumably) presupposes the reality of misjudgments which are themselves a type of mental state.<\/p>\n

Apart from Broad\u2019s discussion, the main roots of eliminative materialism can be found in the writings of a number of mid-20th century philosophers, most notably Wilfred Sellars<\/a>, W.V.O. Quine<\/a>, Paul Feyerabend,<\/a> and Richard Rorty<\/a>. In his important 1956 article, \u201cEmpiricism and the Philosophy of Mind\u201d, Sellars introduced the idea that our conception of mentality may be derived not from direct access to the inner workings of our own minds, but instead from a primitive theoretical framework that we inherit from our culture. While Sellars himself regarded this theoretical framework as empirically correct, his claim that our conception of the mind is theory-based, and at least in principle falsifiable, would be influential to later supporters of eliminativism.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

In principle, anyone denying the existence of some type of thing is an eliminativist with regard to that type of thing. Thus, there have been a number of eliminativists about different aspects of human nature in the history of philosophy. For example, hard determinists like Holbach (1770) are eliminativists with regard to free will because [\u2026]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":661,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[20,47],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-240331","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-futurism","category-neuroscience"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/lifeboat.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/240331","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/lifeboat.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/lifeboat.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/lifeboat.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/661"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/lifeboat.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=240331"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/lifeboat.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/240331\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/lifeboat.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=240331"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/lifeboat.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=240331"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/lifeboat.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=240331"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}