I’ve released my latest paper. Enjoy:

Abstract.

A common interpretation of wakeful, nondestructive mind uploading is that the person with the postoperative original body exclusively persists the preoperative identity and that the person with the upload’s body is some sort of identity copy. A frequent argument supporting this claim is that the preoperative person’s stream of consciousness attaches exclusively to the postoperative person with the original body. By implication, the person with the upload’s body spawns a new stream of consciousness, implying copy identity status. I argue that this is not the best metaphysical model of what happens in nondestructive uploading in the context of a stream of consciousness interpretation, and defend an alternative model which has generally received little attention in the existing literature: the branching identity model.

The idea that our mind could live on in another form after our physical body dies has been a recurring theme in science fiction since the 1950s. Recent television series such as Black Mirror and Upload, as well as some games, demonstrate our continued fascination with this idea. The concept is known as mind uploading.

Recent developments in science and technology are taking us closer to a time when mind uploading could graduate from science fiction to reality.

In 2016, BBC Horizon screened a programme called The Immortalist, in which a
Russian millionaire unveiled his plans to work with neuroscientists, robot builders and other experts to create technology that would allow us to upload our minds to a computer in order to live forever.

At the time, he confidently predicted that this would be achieved by 2045. This seems unlikely, but we are making small but significant steps towards a better understanding of the human brain — and potentially the ability to emulate, or reproduce, it.